Ontologies play a crucial role in the development of the Semantic Web as a means for defining shared terms in web resources. They are formulated in web ontology languages, which are based on expressive description logics. Significant research efforts in the semantic web community are recently directed towards representing and reasoning with uncertainty and vagueness in ontologies for the Semantic Web. In this paper, we give an overview of approaches in this context to managing probabilistic uncertainty, possibilistic uncertainty, and vagueness in expressive description logics for the Semantic Web.
Introduction
The Semantic Web [6, 7, 33, 56] has recently attracted much attention, both from academia and industry, and is widely regarded as the next step in the evolution of the World Wide Web. It aims at an extension of the current Web by standards and technologies that help machines to understand the information on the Web so that they can support richer discovery, data integration, navigation, and automation of tasks. The main ideas behind it are to add a machine-understandable "meaning" to web pages, to use ontologies for a precise definition of shared terms in web resources, to use KR technology for automated reasoning from web resources, and to apply cooperative agent technology for processing the information of the Web.
The Semantic Web consists of several hierarchical layers, where the Ontology layer, in form of the OWL Web Ontology Language [56, 145] (recommended by the W3C), is currently the highest layer of sufficient maturity. OWL consists of three increasingly expressive sublanguages, namely, OWL Lite, OWL DL, and OWL Full. Hence, ontologies [37] (see especially [112] for an introduction to ontologies including a detailed historical account) play a key role in the Semantic Web, and a major effort has been put by the Semantic Web community into this issue. Informally, an ontology consists of a hierarchical description of important and precisely defined concepts in a particular domain, along with the description of the properties (of the instances) of each concept. Web content is then annotated by relying on the concepts defined in a specific domain ontology.
OWL Lite and OWL DL are essentially very expressive description logics [3] with an RDF syntax [56] . More specifically, ontology entailment in OWL Lite and OWL DL reduces to knowledge base (un)satisfiability in the expressive description logics SHIF(D) and SHOIN (D) [55, 57] , respectively. Hence, these expressive description logics play an important role in the Semantic Web, since they are essentially the theoretical counterparts of OWL Lite and OWL DL, respectively. More generally, description logics are a logical reconstruction of frame-based knowledge representation languages, with the aim of providing a decidable first-order formalism with a simple well-established declarative semantics to capture the meaning of the most popular features of structured representation of knowledge.
However, classical ontology languages and description logics are less suitable in all those domains where the information to be represented comes along with (quantitative) uncertainty and/or vagueness (or imprecision). For example, uncertain information may be of the form "John is a teacher with the degree of certainty 0.3 and a student with the degree of certainty 0.7" (roughly, John is either a teacher or a student, but more likely a student), while vague information may be of the form "John is tall with the degree of truth 0.9" (roughly, John is quite tall); see Section 2. Formalisms for dealing with uncertainty and vagueness have started to play an important role in research related to the Web and the Semantic Web. For example, the order in which Google returns the answers to a web search query is computed by using probabilistic techniques. Furthermore, formalisms for dealing with uncertainty and vagueness in ontologies have been successfully applied in ontology matching, data integration, and information retrieval. Vagueness and imprecision also abound in multimedia information processing and retrieval. In addition, handling vagueness is an important aspect of natural language interfaces to the Web. There exists a W3C Incubator Group on Uncertainty Reasoning for the World Wide Web, and an important recent forum for approaches to uncertainty in the Semantic Web is the annual Workshop on Uncertainty Reasoning for the Semantic Web (URSW) at the International Semantic Web Conference (ISWC).
The rising popularity of description logics and their use, and the need to deal with uncertainty and vagueness, both especially in the Semantic Web, is increasingly attracting the attention of many researchers and practitioners towards description logics able to cope with uncertainty and vagueness. The goal of this paper is to provide an overview of the current state of the art about the management of uncertainty and vagueness in description logics for the Semantic Web, which should help the reader to get insights on main features of the formalisms proposed in the literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief introduction to uncertainty and vagueness at the propositional level. In Section 3, we describe the classical description logic SHOIN (D), which is the reference language in this paper. Sections 4 and 5 show how to extend classical description logics by probabilistic and possibilistic uncertainty, respectively, while Section 6 describes how to extend classical description logics for the management of vague/imprecise knowledge. In Section 7, we give a summary and an outlook on open research.
Uncertainty and Vagueness
There has been a long-lasting misunderstanding in the literature of artificial intelligence and uncertainty modeling, regarding the role of probability/possibility theory and vague/fuzzy theory. A clarifying paper is [26] . We recall here salient notes, which may clarify the role of these theories for the inexpert reader.
A standard example that points out the difference between degrees of uncertainty and degrees of truth is that of a bottle [26] . In terms of binary truth values, a bottle is viewed as full or empty. But if one accounts for the quantity of liquid in the bottle, one may e.g. say that the bottle is "half-full". Under this way of speaking, "full" becomes a fuzzy predicate [150] and the degree of truth of "the bottle is full" reflects the amount of liquid in the bottle. The situation is quite different when expressing our ignorance about whether the bottle is either full or empty (given that we know that only one of the two situations is the true one). Saying that the probability that the bottle is full is 0.5 does not mean that the bottle is half full.
We recall that under uncertainty theory fall all those approaches in which statements rather than being either true or false, are true or false to some probability or possibility (for example, "it will rain tomorrow"). That is, a statement is true or false in any world, but we are "uncertain" about which world to consider as the right one, and thus we speak about e.g. a probability distribution or a possibility distribution over the worlds. For example, we cannot exactly establish whether it will rain tomorrow or not, due to our incomplete knowledge about our world, but we can estimate to which degree this is probable, possible, and necessary.
As for the main differences between probability and possibility theory, the prob-ability of an event is the sum of the probabilities of all worlds that satisfy this event, whereas the possibility of an event is the maximum of the possibilities of all worlds that satisfy the event. Intuitively, the probability of an event aggregates the probabilities of all worlds that satisfy this event, whereas the possibility of an event is simply the possibility of the "most optimistic" world that satisfies the event. Hence, although both probability and possibility theory allow for quantifying degrees of uncertainty, they are conceptually quite different from each other. That is, probability and possibility theory represent different facets of uncertainty.
On the other hand, under vagueness/fuzziness theory fall all those approaches in which statements (for example, "the tomato is ripe") are true to some degree, which is taken from a truth space. That is, an interpretation maps a statement to a truth degree, since we are unable to establish whether a statement is completely true or false due to the involvement of vague concepts, such as "ripe", which only have an imprecise definition. For example, we cannot exactly say whether a tomato is ripe or not, but rather can only say that the tomato is ripe to some degree. Usually, such statements involve so-called vague/fuzzy predicates [150] .
Note that all vague/fuzzy statements are truth-functional, that is, the degree of truth of every statement can be calculated from the degrees of truth of its constituents, while uncertain statements cannot be a function of the uncertainties of their constituents [25] . More concretely, in probability theory, only the negation is truthfunctional (see Eq. 1), while in possibility theory, only the disjunction resp. conjunction is truth-functional in possibilities resp. necessities of events (see Eq. 2). Furthermore, fuzzy logics are based on truly many-valued logical operators, while uncertainty logics are defined on top of standard binary logical operators.
In the following, we illustrate a typical formalization of uncertain statements and vague statements. In the former case, we consider a basic probabilistic/possibilistic logic, while in the latter, we consider a basic many-valued logic.
Probabilistic Logic
Probabilistic logic has its origin in philosophy and logic. Its roots can be traced back to Boole in 1854 [11] . There is a wide spectrum of formal languages that have been explored in probabilistic logic, ranging from constraints for unconditional and conditional events to rich languages that specify linear inequalities over events (see especially the work by Nilsson [96] , Fagin et al. [32] , Dubois and Prade et al. [23, 28, 2, 27] , Frisch and Haddawy [34] , and the first author [81, 82, 84] ; see also the survey on sentential probability logic by Hailperin [40] ). Recently, nonmonotonic generalizations of probabilistic logic have been developed and explored; see especially [86] for an overview. In this section, for illustrative purposes, we recall only the simple probabilistic logic described in [96] .
We first define probabilistic formulas and probabilistic knowledge bases. We assume a set of basic events Φ = {p 1 , . . . , p n } with n 1. We use ⊥ and to denote false and true, respectively. We define events by induction as follows. Every element of Φ ∪ {⊥, } is an event. If φ and ψ are events, then also ¬φ, (φ ∧ ψ), (φ ∨ ψ), and (φ → ψ) are events. We adopt the usual conventions to eliminate parentheses. A probabilistic formula is an expression of the form φ l, where φ is an event, and l is a real number from the unit interval [0, 1]. Informally, φ l says that φ is true with a probability of at least l. For example, rain tomorrow 0.7 may express that it will rain tomorrow with a probability of at least 0.7. Notice also that ¬φ 1 − u encodes that φ is true with a probability of at most u. A probabilistic knowledge base K is a finite set of probabilistic formulas.
We next define worlds and probabilistic interpretations. A world I associates with every basic event in Φ a binary truth value. We extend I by induction to all events as usual. We denote by I Φ the (finite) set of all worlds for Φ. A world I satisfies an event φ, or I is a model of φ, denoted I |= φ, iff I(φ) = true. A probabilistic interpretation Pr is a probability function on I Φ (that is, a mapping Pr : I Φ → [0, 1] such that all Pr (I) with I ∈ I Φ sum up to 1). Intuitively, Pr (I) is the degree to which the world I ∈ I Φ is probable, that is, the probability function Pr encodes our "uncertainty" about which world is the right one. The probability of an event φ in Pr , denoted Pr (φ), is the sum of all Pr (I) such that I ∈ I Φ and I |= φ. The following theorem is an immediate consequence of the above definitions.
Theorem 2.1 For all probabilistic interpretations Pr and events φ and ψ, the following relationships hold:
A probabilistic interpretation Pr satisfies a probabilistic formula φ l, or Pr is a model of φ l, denoted Pr |= φ l, iff Pr (φ) l. We say Pr satisfies a probabilistic knowledge base K, or Pr is a model of K, iff Pr satisfies all F ∈ K. We say K is satisfiable iff a model of K exists. A probabilistic formula F is a logical consequence of K, denoted K |= F , iff every model of K satisfies F . We say φ l is a tight logical consequence of K iff l is the infimum of Pr (φ) subject to all models Pr of K. Notice that the latter is equivalent to l = sup {r | K |= φ r}.
The main decision and optimization problems in probabilistic logic are deciding the satisfiability of probabilistic knowledge bases and logical consequences from probabilistic knowledge bases, as well as computing tight logical consequences from probabilistic knowledge bases, which can be done by deciding the solvability of a system of linear inequalities and by solving a linear optimization problem, respectively. In particular, column generation techniques from operations research have been successfully used to solve large problem instances in probabilistic logic; see especially the work by Jaumard et al. [63] and Hansen et al. [45] .
Possibilistic Logic
We next recall possibilistic logic; see especially [21] . The main syntactic and semantic differences to probabilistic logic can be summarized as follows. Syntactically, rather than using probabilistic formulas to constrain the probabilities of propositional events, we now use possibilistic formulas to constrain the necessities and possibilities of propositional events. Semantically, rather than having probability distributions on worlds, each of which associates with every event a unique probability, we now have possibility distributions on worlds, each of which associates with every event a unique possibility and a unique necessity. Differently from the probability of an event, which is the sum of the probabilities of all worlds that satisfy that event, the possibility of an event is the maximum of the possibilities of all worlds that satisfy the event. As a consequence, probabilities and possibilities of events behave quite differently from each other (see Eqs. 1 and 2). These fundamental semantic differences between probabilities and possibilities can also be used as the main criteria for using either probabilistic logic or possibilistic logic in a given application involving uncertainty. In addition, possibilistic logic may especially be used for encoding user preferences, since possibility measures can actually be viewed as rankings (on worlds or also objects) along an ordinal scale.
The semantic differences between probabilities and possibilities are also reflected in the computational properties of possibilistic and probabilistic logic, since reasoning in probabilistic logic generally requires to solve linear optimization problems, while reasoning in possibilistic logic does not, and thus can generally be done with less computational effort. Note that although possibility measures can be viewed as sets of upper probability measures [24] , and possibility and probability measures can be translated into each other [20] , no translations are known between possibilistic and probabilistic knowledge bases as described here.
We first define possibilistic formulas and knowledge bases. Possibilistic formulas have the form P φ l or N φ l, where φ is an event, and l is a real number from [0, 1]. Informally, such formulas encode to what extent φ is possibly resp. necessarily true. For example, P rain tomorrow 0.7 encodes that it will rain tomorrow is possible to degree 0.7, while N father → man 1 says that a father is necessarily a man. A possibilistic knowledge base K is a finite set of possibilistic formulas.
A possibilistic interpretation is a mapping π :
Intuitively, π(I) is the degree to which the world I is possible. In particular, every world I such that π(I) = 0 is impossible, while every world I such that π(I) = 1 is totally possible.
We say π is normalized iff π(I) = 1 for some I ∈ I Φ . Intuitively, this guarantees that there exists at least one world, which could be considered as the real one.
The possibility of an event φ in a possibilistic interpretation π, denoted P oss(φ), is then defined by P oss(φ) = max {π(I) | I ∈ I Φ , I |= φ} (where max ∅ = 0). Intuitively, the possibility of φ is evaluated in the most possible world where φ is true. The dual notion to the possibility of an event φ is the necessity of φ, denoted N ec(φ), which is defined by N ec(φ) = 1 − P oss(¬φ). It reflects the lack of possibility of ¬φ, that is, N ec(φ) evaluates to what extent φ is certainly true. The following theorem follows immediately from the above definitions.
Theorem 2.2 For all possibilistic interpretations π and events φ and ψ, the following relationships hold:
P oss(φ ∧ ψ) min(P oss(φ), P oss(ψ)) ; P oss(φ ∨ ψ) = max(P oss(φ), P oss(ψ)) ; P oss(¬φ) = 1 − N ec(φ) ; P oss(⊥) = 0 ; P oss( ) = 1 (in the normalized case);
A possibilistic interpretation π satisfies a possibilistic formula P φ l (resp., N φ l), or π is a model of P φ l (resp., N φ l), denoted π |= P φ l (resp., π |= N φ l), iff P oss(φ) l (resp., N ec(φ) l). The notions of satisfiability, logical consequence, and tight logical consequence for possibilistic knowledge bases are then defined as usual (in the same way as in the probabilistic case). We refer the reader to [21, 53] for algorithms for possibilistic logic.
Many-Valued Logics
In the setting of many-valued logics, the convention prescribing that a proposition is either true or false is changed. A more refined range is used for the function that represents the meaning of a proposition. This is usual in natural language when words are modeled by fuzzy sets. For example, the compatibility of "tall" in the phrase "a tall man" with some individual of a given height is often graded: The man can be judged not quite tall, somewhat tall, rather tall, very tall, etc. Changing the usual true/false convention leads to a new concept of proposition, whose compatibility with a given state of facts is a matter of degree and can be measured on an ordered scale S that is no longer {0, 1}, but e.g. the unit interval [0, 1] . This leads to identifying a "fuzzy proposition" φ with a fuzzy set of possible states of affairs; the degree of membership of a state of affairs to this fuzzy set evaluates the degree of fit between the proposition and the state of facts it refers to. This degree of fit is called degree of truth of the proposition φ in the interpretation I (state of affairs). Many-valued logics provide compositional calculi of degrees of truth, including degrees between "true" and "false". A sentence is now not true or false only, but may have a truth degree taken from a truth space S,
n n } for an integer n 1. In the sequel, we assume S = [0, 1].
In the many-valued logic that we consider here, many-valued formulas have the form φ l or φ u, where l, u ∈ [0, 1] [39, 41] , which encode that the degree of truth of φ is at least l resp. at most u. For example, ripe tomato 0.9 says that we have a rather ripe tomato (the degree of truth of ripe tomato is at least 0.9).
Semantically, a many-valued interpretation I maps each basic proposition p i into [0, 1] and is then extended inductively to all propositions as follows:
where ⊗, ⊕, , and are so-called combination functions, namely, triangular norms (or t-norms), triangular co-norms (or s-norms), implication functions, and negation functions, respectively, which extend the classical Boolean conjunction, disjunction, implication, and negation, respectively, to the many-valued case.
Several t-norms, s-norms, implication functions, and negation functions have been given in the literature. An important aspect of such functions is that they satisfy some properties that one expects to hold for the connectives; see Tables 1 and 2 . Note that in Table 1 , the two properties Tautology and Contradiction follow from Identity, Commutativity, and Monotonicity. Usually, the implication function is defined as r-implication, that is, a b = sup {c | a ⊗ c b}.
Some t-norms, s-norms, implication functions, and negation functions of various fuzzy logics are shown in Table 3 [41] . In fuzzy logic, one usually distinguishes three different logics, namely, Łukasiewicz, Gödel, and Product logic; the popular Zadeh logic is a sublogic of Łukasiewicz logic. Some salient properties of these logics are shown in Table 4 . For more properties, see especially [41, 98] . Table 1 Properties for t-norms and s-norms. Table 2 Properties for implication and negation functions. Table 3 Combination functions of various fuzzy logics. Table 4 Some additional properties of combination functions of various fuzzy logics.
The implication x y = max(1 − x, y) is called Kleene-Dienes implication in the fuzzy logic literature. Note that we have the following inferences: Let a n and a b m. Then, under Kleene-Dienes implication, we infer that if n > 1 − m then b m. Under r-implication relative to a t-norm ⊗, we infer that b n ⊗ m.
Note that implication functions and t-norms are also used to define the degree of subsumption between fuzzy sets and the composition of two (binary) fuzzy relations. A fuzzy set R over a countable crisp set X is a function R :
The degree of subsumption between two fuzzy sets A and B, denoted A B, is defined as inf x∈X A(x) B(x), where is an implication function. Note that if A(x) B(x), for all x ∈ [0, 1], then A B evaluates to 1. Of course, A B may evaluate to a value v ∈ (0, 1) as well. A (binary) fuzzy relation R over two countable crisp sets X and Y is a function R :
with membership function R −1 (y, x) = R(x, y), for every x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . The composition of two fuzzy relations
A many-valued interpretation I satisfies a many-valued formula φ l (resp., φ u) or I is a model of φ l (resp., φ u), denoted I |= φ l (resp., I |= φ u), iff I(φ) l (resp., I(φ) u). The notions of satisfiability, logical consequence, and tight logical consequence for many-valued knowledge bases are then defined in the standard way (in the same way as in the probabilistic case). We refer the reader to [38, 39, 41] for algorithms for many-valued logics.
Classical Description Logics
In this section, we recall the expressive description logic SHOIN (D) [57] , which stands behind the web ontology languages OWL DL [55, 56] . The purpose of this section is to make the paper self-contained. It also helps in understanding the differences between classical, probabilistic, possibilistic, and fuzzy SHOIN (D). The reader confident with the SHOIN (D) terminology may skip this section.
Syntax
The expressive description logic SHOIN (D) is a generalization of SHOIN by datatypes, such as strings and integers, using concrete domains [4, 89, 88] .
The elementary ingredients are as follows. We assume a set of data values, a set of elementary datatypes, and a set of datatype predicates, where each datatype predicate has a predefined arity n 1. A role is either an abstract role R ∈ R A , the inverse R − of an abstract role R ∈ R A , or a datatype role T ∈ R D (note that datatype roles do not have inverses). We use R − A to denote the set of all inverses of abstract roles in R A .
An RBox R consists of a finite set of transitivity axioms Trans(R), where R ∈ R A , and role inclusion axioms R S, where either R,
We next define the notion of a simple abstract role. For abstract roles R ∈ R A , we define Inv(R) = R − and Inv(R − ) = R. Let R denote the reflexive and transitive closure of on {{R S, Inv(R) Inv(S)} | R S ∈ R, R, S ∈ R A ∪ R − A }. An abstract role S is simple relative to R iff for each abstract role R such that R R S, it holds that (i) Trans(R) ∈ R and (ii) Trans(Inv(R)) ∈ R. Informally, an abstract role S is simple iff it is neither transitive nor has transitive subroles.
Concepts are defined by induction as follows. Each A ∈ A is a concept, ⊥ and are concepts, and if a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ I, then {a 1 , . . . , a n } is a concept (called oneOf).
, and ¬C are concepts (called conjunction, disjunction, and negation, respectively), as well as ∃R.C, ∀R.C, n R, and n R (called exists, value, atleast, and atmost restriction, respectively) for an integer n 0. If D is an n-ary datatype predicate and T, T 1 , . . . , T n ∈ R D , then ∃T 1 , . . . , T n .D, ∀T 1 , . . . , T n .D, n T , and n T are concepts (called datatype exists, value, atleast, and atmost restriction, respectively) for an integer n 0. For example, we may write the concept Flower ∃hasPetalWidth. 20mm ∃hasPetalWidth. 40mm ∃hasColor .Red to denote the set of flowers having petal's dimension within 20mm and 40mm (where we assume that every flower has exactly one associated petal width) whose color is red. Here, 20mm and 40mm are datatype predicates. We eliminate (and add) parentheses as usual, and we often use = 1 R to abbreviate ( 1 R) ( 1 R).
A TBox T is a finite set of concept inclusion axioms C D, where C and D are concepts. We often use C = D to abbreviate C D and D C. An abstract role R is functional if the interpretation of the role R (see below) is always functional. A functional role R can always be obtained from an abstract role by means of the axiom ( 1 R). Therefore, whenever we say that a role is functional, we implicitly assume that
( 1 R) is in the TBox.
An ABox A is a finite set of concept membership axioms a : C, role membership axioms (a, b) : R (resp., (a, v) : T ), equality axioms a = b, and inequality axioms a = b, where C is a concept, R ∈ R A , T ∈ R D , a, b ∈ I, and v is a data value. A knowledge base K = (T , R, A) consists of a TBox T , an RBox R, and an ABox A.
Semantics
and an interpretation function · I that assigns to each a ∈ I an element in
and to every data value, datatype, and datatype predicate the same value as · D . The mapping · I is extended to all roles and concepts as usual (where R I (x) = {y | (x, y) ∈ R I }, and #X denotes the cardinality of the set X):
The satisfaction of an axiom E in an interpretation I = (∆ I , · I ), denoted I |= E, is defined as follows: (1
We say I satisfies E, or I is a model of E, iff I |= E. We say I satisfies a set of axioms E, or I is a model of E, denoted I |= E, iff I |= E for all E ∈ E. An interpretation I satisfies a knowledge base K = (T , R, A), or I is a model of K, denoted I |= K, iff I satisfies each component T , R, and A. A knowledge base K is satisfiable iff it has a model I. An axiom E is a logical consequence of K, denoted K |= E, iff every model of K satisfies E. A concept C is satisfiable relative to K iff K has a model I such that C I = ∅.
Example 3.1 (Car Example) Consider the following excerpt of a simple ontology about cars. Let R = ∅ and let the TBox T contain the following axioms (where maker and topType are abstract roles, while passenger capacity and max speed are datatype roles with the natural numbers N resp. kilometers per hour Km/h as datatypes; the datatype predicate 245km/h is true if the value is at least 245km/h):
( 1 maker ) Car ; ∀maker .Maker ; ( 1 passenger capacity) Car ; ∀passenger capacity.N ; ( 1 max speed ) Car ; ∀max speed .Km/h ;
Roadster Cabriolet ∃passenger capacity.= 2 ; Cabriolet Car ∃topType.SoftTop ; SportsCar = Car ∃max speed . 245km/h .
Informally, the roles maker , passenger capacity, and max speed relate cars to a car maker, a natural number for its passenger capacity, and a value in kilometers per hour for its maximum speed, respectively. Furthermore, roadsters are cabriolets with the passenger capacity two, cabriolets are cars with a soft top, and sports cars are exactly cars with a maximum speed of at least 245 kilometers per hour.
The ABox A contains the following concept membership axioms:
It is then not difficult to verify that some logical consequences of the above knowledge base K = (T , R, A) are given as follows:
K |= tt : ¬SportsCar .
Main Reasoning Problems
The main reasoning problems in SHOIN (D) are deciding the logical consequence of concept inclusion axioms (CSUB), concept membership axioms (CMEM), and role membership axioms from knowledge bases (RMEM), deciding the satisfiability of concepts relative to knowledge bases (CSAT), and deciding the satisfiability of knowledge bases (KBSAT). Note that (i) CSAT and KBSAT can be reduced to each other, (ii) CMEM and RMEM are special cases of CSUB (in SHOIN (D)), and (iii) CSAT and CSUB can be reduced to each other. The above problems are all decidable in SHOIN (D) if all number restrictions in K = (T , R, A) are restricted to simple abstract roles w.r.t. R [58] . Decision procedures are given in [139, 57] , and reasoning tools for SHOIN (D) are, e.g., FaCT++ [141, 54] and Pellet [101] .
Probabilistic Uncertainty and Description Logics
In this section, we recall an important probabilistic generalization of SHOIN (D) towards sophisticated formalisms for reasoning under probabilistic uncertainty in the Semantic Web, called P-SHOIN (D), which has been introduced in [87] .
Note that any other classical description logic can be similarly extended by probabilistic uncertainty. In particular, closely related probabilistic generalizations of DL-Lite and the description logics SHIF(D) and SHOQ(D) (which stand behind the web ontology languages OWL Lite and DAML+OIL, respectively) have been introduced in [87, 36] . The syntax and semantics of such an extension can be defined in the same way as for P-SHOIN (D). Furthermore, if the chosen classical description logic allows for decidable knowledge base satisfiability, then also the main reasoning tasks in the probabilistic extension are all decidable. Note that to allow for probabilistic role membership axioms (encoding that "R(a, b) (resp., U (a, v)) holds with a probability between l and u"), the extended classical description logic should have the oneOf (resp., datatype oneOf) construct.
The syntax of the probabilistic description logic P-SHOIN (D) uses the notion of a conditional constraint from [82] to express probabilistic knowledge in addition to the axioms of SHOIN (D). Its semantics is based on the notion of lexicographic entailment in probabilistic default reasoning [83, 85] , which is a probabilistic generalization of the sophisticated notion of lexicographic entailment by Lehmann [70] in default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases. Due to this semantics, P-SHOIN (D) allows for expressing both terminological probabilistic knowledge about concepts and roles, and also assertional probabilistic knowledge about instances of concepts and roles. It naturally interprets terminological and assertional probabilistic knowledge as statistical knowledge about concepts and roles and as degrees of belief about instances of concepts and roles, respectively, and allows for deriving both statistical knowledge and degrees of belief. As an important additional feature, it also allows for expressing default knowledge about concepts (as a special case of terminological probabilistic knowledge), which is semantically interpreted as in Lehmann's lexicographic default entailment [70] .
The notion of probabilistic lexicographic entailment [83, 85] is an entailment relation for reasoning from statistical knowledge and degrees of belief, which has very nice features [85] . In particular, it shows a similar behavior as reference-class reasoning in a number of uncontroversial examples.
2 But it also avoids many draw-backs of reference-class reasoning (which are pointed out in [5, 85] ): differently from reference-class reasoning, probabilistic lexicographic entailment can handle complex scenarios and even purely probabilistic subjective knowledge as input, and probabilistic lexicographic entailment draws conclusions in a global way from all the available knowledge as a whole. Furthermore, probabilistic lexicographic entailment also has very nice nonmonotonic properties, which are essentially inherited from Lehmann's lexicographic entailment [70] . In particular, it realizes an inheritance of properties along subclass relationships, where more specific properties override less specific properties, without showing the problem of inheritance blocking (where properties are not inherited to subclasses that are exceptional relative to some other properties). For example, under probabilistic lexicographic entailment, the default knowledge (1) "generally, cars do not have a red color" and (2) "generally, sports cars have a red color", and the probabilistic knowledge (3) "cars have four wheels with a probability of at least 0.9" imply that sports cars have four wheels with a probability of at least 0.9. That is, the property of having four wheels with a probability of at least 0.9 is inherited from cars down to sports cars, even though sports cars are exceptional cars relative to the property of having a red color. As for general nonmonotonic properties, probabilistic lexicographic entailment satisfies (probabilistic versions of) the rationality postulates by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor [67] , the property of rational monotonicity, and some irrelevance, conditioning, and inclusion properties. For example, as for the property of irrelevance, under probabilistic lexicographic entailment, the above sentence (3) implies that also red cars have four wheels with a probability of at least 0.9. That is, the property of having a red color is irrelevant to the property of having four wheels with a probability of at least 0.9. All these quite appealing features carry over to the probabilistic description logic P-SHOIN (D). See especially [85] for further details and background on probabilistic lexicographic entailment.
Syntax
We now introduce the notion of a probabilistic knowledge base. It is based on the language of conditional constraints [82] , which encode interval restrictions for conditional probabilities over concepts. Every probabilistic knowledge base consists of (i) a PTBox, which is a classical (description logic) knowledge base along with probabilistic terminological knowledge, and (ii) a collection of PABoxes, which encode probabilistic assertional knowledge about a certain set of individuals. To tions for reasoning from statistical knowledge and degrees of belief. The main idea behind it is to equate the degrees of belief about a particular individual with the statistics of a reference class, which is informally defined as a set of individuals that contains the particular individual and about which we have some statistics. If there are several reference classes with conflicting statistics, then the narrowest one and its statistics are preferred. Even though reference-class reasoning has also been criticized in the literature, there are several uncontroversial examples, where it describes exactly the expected inference results.
this end, we partition the set of individuals I into the set of classical individuals I C and the set of probabilistic individuals I P , and we associate with every probabilistic individual a PABox. That is, probabilistic individuals are those individuals in I for which we explicitly store some probabilistic assertional knowledge in a PABox.
We first define conditional constraints as follows. We assume a finite nonempty set C of basic classification concepts (or basic c-concepts for short), which are (not necessarily atomic) concepts in SHOIN (D) that are free of individuals from I P . Informally, they are the relevant description logic concepts for defining probabilistic relationships. The set of classification concepts (or c-concepts) is inductively defined as follows. Every basic c-concept φ ∈ C is a c-concept. If φ and ψ are c-concepts, then ¬φ and (φ ψ) are also c-concepts. We often write (φ ψ) to abbreviate ¬(¬φ ¬ψ), as usual. A conditional constraint is an expression of the form (ψ|φ) [l, u] , where φ and ψ are c-concepts, and l and u are reals from [0, 1]. Informally, (ψ|φ) [l, u] encodes that the probability of ψ given φ lies between l and u.
We next define PTBoxes, PABoxes, and probabilistic knowledge bases as follows:
• A PTBox PT = (T, P ) consists of a classical (description logic) knowledge base T and a finite set of conditional constraints P ; • A PABox P is a finite set of conditional constraints;
• A probabilistic knowledge base K = (T, P, (P o ) o∈I P ) relative to I P consists of a PTBox PT = (T, P ) and one PABox P o for every probabilistic individual o ∈ I P .
Note that the meaning of a conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[l, u] depends on whether it belongs to P or to P o for some probabilistic individual o ∈ I P :
• Each (ψ|φ)[l, u] in P informally encodes that "generally, if an object belongs to φ, then it belongs to ψ with a probability in [l, u]". For example, (∃R.{o}|φ) [l, u] in P , where o ∈ I C and R ∈ R A , encodes that "generally, if an object belongs to φ, then it is related to o by R with a probability in
where o ∈ I P , informally encodes that "if o belongs to φ, then o belongs to ψ with a probability in [l, u]". For example, (∃R.{o }|φ) [l, u] in P o , where o ∈ I P , o ∈ I C , and R ∈ R A , expresses that "if o belongs to φ, then o is related to o by R with a probability in [l, u]".
So, a probabilistic knowledge base K = (T, P, (P o ) o∈I P ) extends a classical knowledge base T by probabilistic terminological knowledge P and probabilistic assertional knowledge P o about every o ∈ I P . That is, P represents our statistical knowledge about concepts, while every P o represents our degrees of belief about o.
Observe that the axioms in T and the conditional constraints in every P o with o ∈ I P are strict (that is, they must always hold), while the conditional constraints in P are defeasible (that is, they may have exceptions and thus do not always have to hold), since T ∪ P may not always be satisfiable as a whole in combination with our degrees of belief (and then we ignore some elements of P ).
Consequently, a conditional constraint (ψ|φ) [1, 1] in P encodes "generally, if an object belongs to φ, then it also belongs to ψ", while (ψ|φ) [1, 1] in P o encodes "if o belongs to φ, then o also belongs to ψ". The latter is equivalent to the implication o : φ ⇒ o : ψ, while the former is in general not equivalent to φ ψ.
Example 4.1 (Car Example cont'd) We now extend the classical description logic knowledge base T given in Example 3.1 by terminological default, terminological probabilistic, and assertional probabilistic knowledge to a probabilistic knowledge base K = (T, P, (P o ) o∈I P ). We assume an additional atomic concept HasFourWheels and an additional datatype role HasColor between cars and the elementary datatype colors, which has a finite set of color names as data values.
The terminological default knowledge (1) "generally, cars do not have a red color" and (2) "generally, sports cars have a red color", and the terminological probabilistic knowledge (3) "cars have four wheels with a probability of at least 0.9", can be expressed by the following conditional constraints in P : Suppose we want to encode some probabilistic information about John's car (which we have not seen so far). Then, the set of probabilistic individuals I P contains the individual John's car, and the assertional probabilistic knowledge (4) "John's car is a sports car with a probability of at least 0.8" (we know that John likes sports cars) can be expressed by the following conditional constraint in P John's car :
Semantics
In this section, we define the semantics of P-SHOIN (D). After some preliminaries, we introduce the notions of consistency and lexicographic entailment for probabilistic knowledge bases, which are based on the notions of consistency and lexicographic entailment, respectively, in probabilistic default reasoning [83, 85] .
Preliminaries
We now define (possible) objects and probabilistic interpretations, which are certain sets of basic c-concepts resp. probability functions on the set of all (possible) objects. We also define the satisfaction of classical knowledge bases and conditional constraints in probabilistic interpretations.
A (possible) object o is a set of basic c-concepts φ ∈ C such that {i : φ | φ ∈ o} ∪ {i : ¬φ | φ ∈ C \ o} is satisfiable, where i is a new individual. Informally, every object o represents an individual i that is fully specified on C in the sense that o belongs (resp., does not belong) to every c-concept φ ∈ o (resp., φ ∈ C \ o). We denote by O C the set of all objects relative to C. An object o satisfies a classical knowledge base
We define the probability of a c-concept and the satisfaction of conditional constraints in probabilistic interpretations as follows. The probability of a c-concept φ in a probabilistic interpretation Pr denoted Pr (φ)
We say Pr satisfies a set of conditional constraints F, or Pr is a model of F, denoted Pr |= F, iff Pr |= F for all F ∈ F. It is not difficult to verify that a classical knowledge base T is satisfiable iff there exists a probabilistic interpretation that satisfies T .
Consistency
The notion of consistency for PTBoxes and probabilistic knowledge bases is based on the notion of consistency in probabilistic default reasoning [83, 85] .
We first give some preparative definitions. A probabilistic interpretation Pr verifies a conditional constraint (ψ|φ) [l, u] iff Pr (φ) = 1 and Pr (ψ) ∈ [l, u], that is, iff Pr (φ) = 1 and Pr |= (ψ|φ) [l, u] . We say Pr falsifies (ψ|φ)[l, u] iff Pr (φ) = 1 and Pr |= (ψ|φ) [l, u] . A set of conditional constraints F tolerates a conditional constraint F under a classical knowledge base T iff T ∪ F has a model that verifies F .
A PTBox PT = (T, P ) is consistent iff (i) T is satisfiable and (ii) there exists an ordered partition (P 0 , . . . , P k ) of P such that each P i with i ∈ {0, . . . , k} is the set of all F ∈ P \ (P 0 ∪ · · · ∪ P i−1 ) that are tolerated under T by P \ (P 0 ∪ · · · ∪ P i−1 ). Informally, condition (ii) means that P has a natural ordered partition into collections of conditional constraints of increasing specificities such that every collection is locally consistent. That is, any inconsistencies can be naturally resolved by preferring more specific pieces of knowledge to less specific ones. For example, the inconsistency between (¬∃ HasColor.{red} | Car) [1, 1] and (∃ HasColor.{red} | SportsCar) [1, 1] when reasoning about sports cars is naturally resolved by preferring the latter to the former. We call the above (unique) ordered partition (P 0 , . . . , P k ) of P the z-partition of PT . A probabilistic knowledge base K = (T, P, (P o ) o∈I P ) is consistent iff (i) PT = (T, P ) is consistent and (ii) T ∪ P o is satisfiable for every probabilistic individual o ∈ I P . Informally, (ii) says that the strict knowledge in T must be compatible with the strict degrees of belief in P o , for every probabilistic individual o. Observe that (i) involves T and P , while (ii) involves T and P o , for every probabilistic individual o. This separate treatment of P and the P o 's is due to the fact that P represents probabilistic terminological knowledge, while each P o represents probabilistic assertional knowledge (about o).
Example 4.2 (Car Example cont'd)
The probabilistic knowledge base K = (T, P, (P o ) o∈I P ) of Example 4.1 is consistent, since PT = (T, P ) is consistent, and T ∪ P o is satisfiable for every probabilistic individual o ∈ I P = {John's car}. Observe that the z-partition of (T, P ) is given by (P 0 , P 1 ), where
Lexicographic Entailment
The notion of lexicographic entailment for probabilistic knowledge bases is based on lexicographic entailment in probabilistic default reasoning [83, 85] . In the sequel, let K = (T, P, (P o ) o∈I P ) be a consistent probabilistic knowledge base. We first define a lexicographic preference relation on probabilistic interpretations, which is then used to define the notion of lexicographic entailment for sets of conditional constraints under PTBoxes. We finally define the notion of lexicographic entailment for deriving statistical knowledge and degrees of belief about probabilistic objects from PTBoxes and probabilistic knowledge bases, respectively.
We use the (unique) z-partition (P 0 , . . . , P k ) of (T, P ) (see Section 4.2.2) to define a lexicographic preference relation on probabilistic interpretations Pr and Pr : We say Pr is lexicographically preferable (or lex-preferable) to Pr iff some i ∈ {0, . . . , k} exists such that |{F ∈ P i | Pr |= F }| > |{F ∈ P i | Pr |= F }| and |{F ∈ P j | Pr |= F }| = |{F ∈ P j | Pr |= F }| for all i < j k. Roughly speaking, this preference relation implements the idea of preferring more specific pieces of knowledge to less specific ones in the case of local inconsistencies. It can thus be used for ignoring the latter when drawing conclusions in the case of local inconsistencies. A model Pr of a classical knowledge base T and a set of conditional constraints F is a lexicographically minimal (or lex-minimal) model of T ∪ F iff no model of T ∪ F is lex-preferable to Pr .
We define the notion of lexicographic entailment of conditional constraints from sets of conditional constraints under PTBoxes as follows. A conditional constraint (ψ|φ)[l, u] is a lexicographic consequence (or lex-consequence) of a set of con-
under PT , iff l (resp., u) is the infimum (resp., supremum) of Pr (ψ) subject to all lex-minimal models Pr of T ∪ F ∪ {(φ| ) [ We now define which statistical knowledge and degrees of belief follow under lexicographic entailment from PTBoxes PT and probabilistic knowledge bases Hence, in addition to the sentences (1) to (3) directly encoded in P , we also conclude "generally, roadsters do not have a red color", "sports cars have four wheels with a probability of at least 0.9", and "roadsters have four wheels with a probability of at least 0.9". Observe here that the default property of not having a red color and the probabilistic property of having four wheels with a probability of at least 0.9 are inherited from cars down to roadsters. Roughly, the tight lex-consequences of PT = (T, P ) are given by all those conditional constraints that (a) are either in P , or (b) can be constructed by inheritance along subconcept relationships from the ones in P and are not overridden by more specific pieces of knowledge in P .
The following conditional constraints for the probabilistic individual John's car are some (assertional probabilistic) tight lex-consequences of K = (T, P, (P o ) o∈I P ), which informally say that John's car is a sports car, has a red color, and has four wheels with probabilities of at least 0.8, 0.8, and 0.72, respectively:
Main Reasoning Problems
The main reasoning problems in P-SHOIN (D) are summarized by the following decision and computation problems (where every lower and upper bound in the PTBox PT = (T, P ), the probabilistic knowledge base K = (T, P, (P o ) o∈I P ), and the set of conditional constraints F is rational):
PTBOX CONSISTENCY (PTCON): Given a PTBox PT = (T, P ), decide whether PT is consistent.
PROBABILISTIC KNOWLEDGE BASE CONSISTENCY (PKBCON):
Given a probabilistic knowledge base K = (T, P, (P o ) o∈I P ), decide whether K is consistent.
TIGHT LEXICOGRAPHIC ENTAILMENT (TLEXENT): Given a PTBox PT = (T, P ), a finite set of conditional constraints F, and two c-concepts φ and ψ, compute the rational numbers l, u
Some important special cases of TLEXENT are given as follows: (PCSUB) given a consistent PTBox PT and two c-concepts φ and ψ, compute the rational numbers l, u ∈ [0, 1] such that PT ∼ There exists an algorithm for deciding whether a PTBox (resp., probabilistic knowledge base) in P-SHOIN (D) is consistent, which is based on a reduction to deciding whether a classical knowledge base in SHOIN (D) is satisfiable and to deciding whether a system of linear constraints is solvable. More specifically, one has to solve a sequence of solvability problems of systems of linear constraints, whose variables are computed by deciding classical knowledge base satisfiabil-ity in SHOIN (D) (see [87] for further details). This shows that the two consistency problems in P-SHOIN (D) are both decidable. Furthermore, there is a similar algorithm for computing tight intervals under lexicographic entailment in P-SHOIN (D), which is based on a reduction to deciding classical knowledge base satisfiability in SHOIN (D) and to solving linear optimization problems (see [87] ). Thus, also lexicographic entailment in P-SHOIN (D) is computable. As for the computational complexity, deciding the two consistency problems in P-SHOIN (D) is complete for the complexity class NEXP, while computing tight intervals under lexicographic entailment in P-SHOIN (D) belongs to FP NEXP [87] .
Although there is no implementation of P-SHOIN (D) to date, there are already implementations of its predecessor P-SHOQ(D) (see [95] ) and of a probabilistic description logic based on probabilistic default reasoning as in [83, 85] (see [?] ).
Main Applications
As pointed out in [14, 15] , there is a plethora of applications with an urgent need for handling probabilistic knowledge in ontologies, especially in areas like medicine, biology, defense, and astronomy. Furthermore, there are strong arguments for the critical need of dealing with probabilistic uncertainty in ontologies in the Semantic Web, some of which are briefly summarized as follows.
• In addition to being logically related, the concepts of an ontology are generally also probabilistically related. For example, two concepts either may be logically related via a subset or disjointness relationship, or they may show a certain degree of overlap. Probabilistic ontologies allow for quantifying these degrees of overlap, reasoning about them, and using them in semantic-web applications. In particular, probabilistic ontologies are successfully used in information retrieval for an increased recall [142, 59] (see also below). The degrees of concept overlap may also be exploited in personalization and recommender systems.
• Rather than consisting of one standardized overall ontology, the Semantic Web will consist of a huge collection of different ontologies. Hence, in semanticweb applications such as automated reasoning and information retrieval, one has to align the concepts of different ontologies, which is called ontology matching / mapping [30] . In general, the concepts of two different ontologies do not match exactly, and we have to deal with degrees of concept overlap as above, which are determined by automatic or semi-automatic tools or experts. These degrees of concept overlap are then represented in probabilistic ontologies, which thus allows for inference about the degrees of overlap between other concepts and about probabilistic instance relationships [100, 94] (see also Section 4.5.2).
• Like the current Web, the Semantic Web will necessarily contain ambiguous and controversial pieces of information in different web sources. This can be handled via probabilistic data integration by associating with every web source a proba-bility describing its degree of reliability [143, 44] . As resulting pieces of data, such a probabilistic data integration process necessarily produces probabilistic facts, that is, probabilistic knowledge at the instance level. Such probabilistic instance relationships can be encoded in probabilistic ontologies and there be enhanced by further classical and/or terminological probabilistic knowledge, which then allows for inference about other probabilistic instance relationships.
An important application for probabilistic ontologies (and thus probabilistic description logics and ontology languages) is especially information retrieval. In particular, Subrahmanian's group [142, 59] explores the use of probabilistic ontologies in relational databases. They propose to extend relations by associating with every attribute a constrained probabilistic ontology, which describes relationships between terms occurring in the domain of that attribute. An extension of the relational algebra then allows for an increased recall (which is the proportion of documents relevant to a search query in the collection of all returned documents) in information retrieval. In closely related work, Mantay et al. [91] propose a probabilistic least common subsumer operation, which is based on a probabilistic extension of the description logic ALN . They show that applying this approach in information retrieval allows for reducing the amount of retrieved data and thus for avoiding information flood. Another closely related work by Holi and Hyvönen [47, 48] shows how degrees of overlap between concepts can be modeled and computed efficiently using Bayesian networks based on RDF(S) ontologies. Such degrees of overlap indicate how well an individual data item matches the query concept, and can thus be used for measuring the relevance in information retrieval tasks. Finally, Weikum et al. [146] and Thomas and Sheth [138] describe the use of probabilistic ontologies in information retrieval from a more general perspective.
Other Probabilistic Ontology Languages
To our knowledge, there are no other approaches to probabilistic description logics for the Semantic Web in the literature. Furthermore, although there are several previous approaches to probabilistic description logics without semantic web background, P-SHOIN (D) is the most expressive probabilistic description logic, both in terms of the generalized classical description logic and in terms of the supported forms of terminological and assertional probabilistic knowledge. That is, previous probabilistic description logics generalize less expressive classical description logics, and they only allow for some facets of the terminological and assertional probabilistic knowledge of this paper, but not for all of them at the same time. There are also several probabilistic extensions of web ontology languages in the literature.
In this section, we give an overview of all these approaches.
Probabilistic Description Logics
Other approaches to probabilistic description logics can be classified according to the generalized classical description logics, the supported forms of probabilistic knowledge, the underlying probabilistic semantics, and the reasoning techniques.
One of the earliest approaches to probabilistic description logics is due to Heinsohn [46] , who presents a probabilistic extension of the description logic ALC, which allows to represent terminological probabilistic knowledge about concepts and roles, and which is based on the notion of logical entailment in probabilistic logics, similar to [96, 2, 34, 82] . Heinsohn [46] , however, does not allow for assertional (classical or probabilistic) knowledge about concept and role instances. The main reasoning problems are deciding the consistency of probabilistic terminological knowledge bases and computing logically entailed tight probability intervals. Heinsohn proposes a sound and complete global reasoning technique based on classical reasoning in ALC and linear programming, as well as a sound but incomplete local reasoning technique based on the iterative application of local inference rules.
Another early approach to probabilistic description logics is due to Jaeger [61] , who also proposes a probabilistic extension of the description logic ALC, which allows for terminological probabilistic knowledge about concepts and roles, and assertional probabilistic knowledge about concept instances, but does not support assertional probabilistic knowledge about role instances (but he mentions a possible extension in this direction). The entailment of terminological probabilistic knowledge from terminological probabilistic knowledge is based on the notion of logical entailment in probabilistic logic, while the entailment of assertional probabilistic knowledge from terminological and assertional probabilistic knowledge is based on a cross-entropy minimization relative to terminological probabilistic knowledge.
The main reasoning problems are terminological probabilistic consistency and inference, which are solved by linear programming, and assertional probabilistic consistency and inference, which are solved by an approximation algorithm.
The recent work by Dürig and Studer [29] presents a further probabilistic extension of ALC, which is based on a model-theoretic semantics as in probabilistic logics, but which only allows for assertional probabilistic knowledge about concept and role instances, and not for terminological probabilistic knowledge. The paper also explores independence assumptions for assertional probabilistic knowledge. The main reasoning problem is deciding the consistency of assertional probabilistic knowledge, but neither an algorithm nor a decidability result is given.
Jaeger's recent work [62] focuses on interpreting probabilistic concept subsumption and probabilistic role quantification through statistical sampling distributions, and develops a probabilistic version of the guarded fragment of first-order logic. The semantics is different from the semantics of all the other probabilistic description logics in this paper, since it is based on probability distributions over the domain, and not on the more commonly used probability distributions over a set of possible worlds. The paper proposes a sound Gentzen-style sequent calculus for the logic, but it neither proves the completeness of this calculus nor decidability in general.
Koller et al.'s work [66] presents the probabilistic description logic P-CLASSIC, which is a probabilistic generalization (of a variant) of the description logic CLAS-SIC. Similar to Heinsohn's work [46] , it allows for encoding terminological probabilistic knowledge about concepts, roles, and attributes (via so-called p-classes), but it does not support assertional (classical or probabilistic) knowledge about instances of concepts and roles. However, in contrast to [46] , its probabilistic semantics is based on a reduction to Bayesian networks. The main reasoning problem is to determine the exact probabilities for conditionals between concept expressions in canonical form. This problem is solved by a reduction to inference in Bayesian networks. As an important feature of P-CLASSIC, the above problem can be solved in polynomial time, when the underlying Bayesian network is a polytree. Note that a recent implementation of P-CLASSIC is described in [?] .
Closely related work by Yelland [148] proposes a probabilistic extension of a description logic close to FL, whose probabilistic semantics is also based on a reduction to Bayesian networks, and it applies this approach to market analysis. The approach allows for encoding terminological probabilistic knowledge about concepts and roles, but it does not support assertional (classical or probabilistic) knowledge about instances of concepts and roles. Like in Koller et al.'s work [66] , the main reasoning problem is to determine the exact probabilities for conditionals between concepts, which is solved by a reduction to inference in Bayesian networks.
Probabilistic Web Ontology Languages
The literature contains several probabilistic generalizations of web ontology languages. Many of these approaches focus especially on combining the web ontology language OWL with probabilistic formalisms based on Bayesian networks.
In particular, da Costa [14] , da Costa and Laskey [15] , and da Costa et al. [16] suggest a probabilistic generalization of OWL, called PR-OWL, whose probabilistic semantics is based on multi-entity Bayesian networks (MEBNs). The latter are a Bayesian logic that combines first-order logic with Bayesian networks. Roughly speaking, PR-OWL represents knowledge as parameterized fragments of Bayesian networks. Hence, it can encode probability distributions on the interpretations of an associated first-order theory as well as repeated structure.
In [18, 19] , Ding et al. propose a probabilistic generalization of OWL, called Bayes-OWL, which is based on standard Bayesian networks. BayesOWL provides a set of rules and procedures for the direct translation of an OWL ontology into a Bayesian network, and it also provides a method for incorporating available probability constraints when constructing the Bayesian network. The generated Bayesian network, which preserves the semantics of the original ontology and which is consistent with all the given probability constraints, supports ontology reasoning, both within and across ontologies, as Bayesian inferences. In [100, 19] , Ding et al. also describe an application of the BayesOWL approach in ontology mapping.
In closely related work, Mitra et al. [94] describe an implemented technique, called OMEN, to enhancing existing ontology mappings by using a Bayesian network to represent the influences between potential concept mappings across ontologies. More concretely, OMEN is based on a simple ontology model similar to RDF Schema. It uses a set of meta-rules that capture the influence of the ontology structure and the semantics of ontology relations, and matches nodes that are neighbors of already matched nodes in the two ontologies.
Yang and Calmet [147] present an integration of the web ontology language OWL with Bayesian networks, called OntoBayes. The approach makes use of probability and dependency-annotated OWL to represent uncertain information in Bayesian networks. The work also describes an application in risk analysis for insurance and natural disaster management. Pool and Aikin [103] also provide a method for representing uncertainty in OWL ontologies, while Fukushige [35] proposes a basic framework for representing probabilistic relationships in RDF. Nottelmann and Fuhr [97] present two probabilistic extensions of variants of OWL Lite, along with a mapping to locally stratified probabilistic Datalog.
Another important work is due to Udrea et al.
[?], who present a probabilistic generalization of RDF, which allows for representing terminological probabilistic knowledge about classes and assertional probabilistic knowledge about properties of individuals. They provide a technique for assertional probabilistic inference in acyclic probabilistic RDF theories, which is based on the notion of logical entailment in probabilistic logic, coupled with a local probabilistic semantics. They also provide a prototype implementation of their algorithms.
Possibilistic Uncertainty and Description Logics
Similar to probabilistic extensions of description logics, possibilistic extensions of description logics have been developed by Hollunder [53] and Dubois et al. [22] . In the sequel, we implicitly assume the description logic SHOIN (D) as underlying description logic, but any other (decidable) description logic can be used as well.
Syntax
A possibilistic axiom is of the form P α l or N α l, where α is a classical description logic axiom, and l is a real number from [0, 1]. A possibilistic RBox (resp., TBox, ABox) is a finite set of possibilistic axioms P α l or N α l, where α is an RBox (resp., TBox, ABox) axiom. A possibilistic knowledge base K = (R, T , A) consists of a possibilistic RBox R, a possibilistic TBox T , and a possibilistic ABox A. The following example from [53] illustrates possibilistic knowledge bases. Furthermore, the ABox A expresses the possibilistic assertional knowledge that "Tom owns a 911 with necessity 1", "a 911 is a Porsche with necessity 1", and "Tom is not a car fanatic with a necessity of at least 0.7":
Semantics
Let denote the set of all classical description logic interpretations. A possibilistic interpretation is a mapping π :
In the sequel, we assume that π is normalized, that is, that π(I) = 1 for some I ∈ . The possibility of a description logic axiom α in a possibilistic interpretation π, denoted P oss(α), is then defined by P oss(α) = max {π(I) | I ∈ , I |= α} (where max ∅ = 0), and the necessity of α, denoted N ec(α), is defined by N ec(α) = 1 − P oss(¬α).
A possibilistic interpretation π satisfies a possibilistic axiom P α l (resp., N α l), or π is a model of P α l (resp., N α l), denoted π |= P α l (resp., π |= N α l), iff Poss(α) l (resp., Nec(α) l). The notion of satisfiability of possibilistic knowledge bases and the notions of logical and tight logical consequences of possibilistic axioms from possibilistic knowledge bases are then defined as usual [53, 22] . It is not difficult to verify that K is satisfiable and logically implies that "Tom is a golfer with a possibility of at least 0.7" [53] , that is, K |= P Tom : golfer 0.7 .
Main Reasoning Problems
The main reasoning problems related to possibilistic description logics are deciding whether a possibilistic knowledge base is satisfiable, deciding whether a possibilistic axiom is a logical consequence of a possibilistic knowledge base, and computing the tight lower and upper bounds entailed by a possibilistic knowledge base for the necessity and the possibility of a classical description logic axiom. As shown by Hollunder [53] , deciding logical consequences, and thus also deciding satisfiability and computing tight lower and upper bounds can be reduced to deciding logical consequences in classical description logics. A recent implementation of reasoning in possibilistic description logics using KAON2
3 is reported in [105, 104] .
Main Applications
Liau and Yao [78] report on an application of possibilistic description logics in information retrieval. More concretely, they define a possibilistic generalization of the description logic ALC and show that it can be used in typical information retrieval problems, such as query relaxation, query restriction, and exemplar-based retrieval. Possibilistic description logics can also be used for handling inconsistencies in ontologies [105, 104] . Another important application of possibilistic description logics is the representation of user preferences in the Semantic Web. For example, the recent work by Hadjali et al. [?] shows that possibilistic logic can be nicely used for encoding user preferences in the context of databases.
Vagueness and Description Logics
In this section, we define the syntax and the semantics of a fuzzy generalization of SHOIN (D), called fuzzy SHOIN (D). We recall here the semantics given in [127, 130] , 4 which is based on arbitrary but fixed combination functions ⊗, ⊕, , and (see Section 2.3). After describing the main reasoning problems in vague description logics, we summarize their main applications, and we also give an overview on other vague ontology languages.
Syntax
We now define the syntax of fuzzy SHOIN (D). We first define fuzzy datatype theories and fuzzy modifiers, and then fuzzy axioms and fuzzy knowledge bases.
Fuzzy Datatype Theories
We have seen that SHOIN (D) allows to reason with datatypes, such as strings and integers, using so-called concrete domains. In the fuzzy generalization, concrete domains and thus datatypes may be based on fuzzy sets as well. More specifically, a fuzzy datatype theory
is defined in the same way as a classical datatype theory except that · D now assigns to every n-ary datatype predicate an n-ary fuzzy relation over ∆ D . For example, like in SHOIN (D), the datatype predicate 18 may be a unary crisp predicate over the natural numbers denoting the set of integers smaller or equal to 18, that is, 18 : Natural → [0, 1] and
defines persons, whose age is less or equal to 18, that is, it defines minors.
As for non-crisp fuzzy datatype predicates, we recall that in fuzzy set theory and practice, there are many functions for specifying fuzzy set membership degrees. In particular, the triangular, the trapezoidal, the left-shoulder, and the right-shoulder functions are simple, but most frequently used to specify fuzzy set membership degrees (see Fig. 1 ). Using these functions, we may then define, for example, Young : Natural → [0, 1] to be a fuzzy datatype predicate over the natural numbers denoting the degree of youngness of a person's age. The fuzzy datatype predicate Young may be defined as Young(x) = ls(x; 10, 30). Then,
denotes young persons.
Fuzzy Modifiers
Fuzzy SHOIN (D) also supports fuzzy modifiers, an interesting feature of fuzzy logics. Fuzzy modifiers, like very, more or less, and slightly, apply to fuzzy sets to change their membership function. 
where very is a fuzzy modifier with membership function f very (x) = x 2 , and High is a fuzzy datatype predicate over the domain of speed expressed in kilometers per hour and may be defined as High(x) = rs(x; 80, 250).
Fuzzy Knowledge Bases
We next define fuzzy knowledge bases in fuzzy SHOIN (D). We first define concepts and fuzzy axioms in fuzzy SHOIN (D).
Concepts in fuzzy SHOIN (D) are defined in nearly the same way as concepts in SHOIN (D), except that we now also allow fuzzy modifiers from a set of fuzzy modifiers M as unary operators on concepts. More concretely, Concepts in fuzzy SHOIN (D) are defined by induction as follows. Every atomic concept A ∈ A is a concept, ⊥ and are concepts, and if a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ I, then {a 1 , . . . , a n } is a concept (called oneOf). If C, C 1 , C 2 are concepts, R ∈ R A ∪ R − A , and m ∈ M, then (C 1 C 2 ), (C 1 C 2 ), ¬C, and m(C) are concepts (called conjunction, disjunction, negation, and fuzzy modification, respectively), as well as ∃R.C, ∀R.C, n R, and n R (called exists, value, atleast, and atmost restriction, respectively) for an integer n 0. If D is an n-ary datatype predicate and T, T 1 , . . . , T n ∈ R D , then ∃T 1 , . . . , T n .D, ∀T 1 , . . . , T n .D, n T , and n T are concepts (called datatype exists, value, atleast, and atmost restriction, respectively) for an integer n 0. We eliminate parentheses as usual. For decidability reasons, number restrictions are restricted to simple abstract roles.
We define fuzzy axioms, fuzzy RBoxes, fuzzy TBoxes, fuzzy ABoxes, and fuzzy knowledge bases in fuzzy SHOIN (D) as follows.
A fuzzy RBox R is a finite set of transitivity axioms Trans(R) in SHOIN (D) and fuzzy role inclusion axioms of the form α n, α n, α > n, and α < n, where α is a role inclusion axiom in SHOIN (D), and n ∈ [0, 1].
A fuzzy TBox T is a finite set of fuzzy concept inclusion axioms α n, α n, α > n, and α < n, where α is a concept inclusion axiom in SHOIN (D), and n ∈ [0, 1].
A fuzzy ABox A consists of a finite set of equality and inequality axioms a = b and a = b, respectively, and of fuzzy concept and fuzzy role membership axioms of the form α n, α n, α > n, or α < n, where α is a concept or role membership axiom in SHOIN (D), and n ∈ [0, 1].
For example, a : C 0.1, (a, b) : R 0.3, R S 0.4, and C D 0.6 are fuzzy axioms. Informally, from a semantical point of view, a fuzzy axiom α n (resp., α n, α > n, and α < n) constrains the membership degree of α to be at least (resp., at most, greater than, and less than) n. Hence, jim : YoungPerson 0.2 says that jim is a YoungPerson with degree at least 0.2. On the other hand, a fuzzy concept inclusion axiom of the form C D n says that the subsumption degree between C and D is at least n.
A fuzzy axiom is a transitivity, a fuzzy concept inclusion, a fuzzy role inclusion, a fuzzy concept membership, a fuzzy role membership, an equality, or an inequality axiom. A fuzzy knowledge base K = (R, T , A) consists of a fuzzy RBox R, a fuzzy TBox T , and a fuzzy ABox A.
Semantics
We now define the semantics of fuzzy SHOIN (D). The main idea behind it is that concepts and roles are interpreted as fuzzy subsets of an interpretation's domain. Therefore, axioms in fuzzy SHOIN (D), rather being satisfied (true) or unsatisfied (false) in an interpretation, are associated with a degree of truth in [0, 1]. In the following, let ⊗, ⊕, , and be an arbitrary but fixed t-norm, s-norm, negation function, and implication function, respectively (see Table 3 for some specific choices). As such, the semantics is a generalization of [121] in which Zadeh Logic has been used as specific interpretation of the connectives (see Table 3 ).
A fuzzy interpretation I = (∆ I , · I ) relative to a fuzzy datatype theory D = (∆ D , ·but it has a fuzzy one. Indeed, in [42] , it is shown that in Gödel logic it has no finite model, but it has an infinite fuzzy model.
Another point concerns the semantics of number restrictions. The semantics of the concept n R is equivalent to
which is the result of viewing n R as the open first-order formula
That is, there are at least n distinct elements that satisfy to some degree R(x, y i ). This also guarantees that ∃R. ≡ ( 1 R).
Similarly, the semantics of n R is equivalent to
which is the result of viewing n R as the open first order formula
Note that not necessarily ( n R) ≡ ¬( n + 1 R) holds. The equivalence is true for Zadeh and Łukasiewicz logic, but neither for Gödel nor for Product logic.
We extend · I to all non-fuzzy axioms as follows (where a, b ∈ I and v ∈ ∆ D ):
Note here that, e.g., the semantics of a concept inclusion axiom C D is derived directly from its FOL translation, which is of the form ∀x.
This definition is clearly different from the approaches in which C D is viewed as ∀x.C(x) D(x) (e.g., [121, 118] ). This latter approach has the effect that the subsumption relationship is a classical {0, 1} relationship, while in the former approach, subsumption is determined up to a certain degree in [0, 1].
We next define what it means that a fuzzy interpretation I satisfies a fuzzy axiom E, or I is a model of E, denoted I |= E, as follows. We define (1) I |= Trans(R) iff
for all x, y ∈ ∆ I , (2) I |= α θ n, where θ ∈ { , , >, <}, iff α I θ n, (3) I |= a = b iff a I = b I , and (4) I |= a = b iff a I = b I . We say that a concept C is satisfiable iff there exists an interpretation I = (∆ I , · I ) and an individual x ∈ ∆ I such that C I (x) > 0. We say that I satisfies a set of fuzzy axioms E, or I is a model of E, denoted I |= E, iff I |= E for all E ∈ E. We say I satisfies a fuzzy knowledge base K = (R, T , A), or I is a model of K, denoted I |= K, iff I is a model of T ∪ R ∪ A. We say K is satisfiable iff it has a model. A fuzzy axiom E is a logical consequence of a fuzzy knowledge base K, denoted K |= E, iff every model of K satisfies E.
An interesting point here is that according to the semantics of fuzzy SHOIN (D), e.g., a minor is a young person to a certain degree and is obtained without explicitly mentioning it. This inference cannot be achieved in classical SHOIN (D). Similarly, referring to Example 3.1, in fuzzy SHOIN (D), the car tt is a sports car to a certain degree. Therefore, unlike Example 3.1, tt is now closely a sports car, as it should be. The following two examples highlight these aspects.
Example 6.1 (Car Example cont'd) Example 3.1 illustrates an evident difficulty in defining the class of sports cars. Indeed, it is highly questionable why a car whose maximum speed is 243km/h is not a sports car anymore. Essentially, the higher the maximum speed, the more closely a car is a sports car, which makes the concept of a sports car a fuzzy concept, that is, a vague concept, rather than a crisp one. In the next section, we see how to represent such concepts more appropriately. Let us now reconsider Example 3.1, where all the axioms of the TBox and ABox are asserted with degree 1, that is, are of the form α 1. We replace the definition of SportsCar by the definition in (6) . Then, we have that (under Łukasiewicz logic)
Main Reasoning Problems
In addition to the standard problems of deciding the satisfiability of fuzzy knowledge bases, deciding the satisfiability of concepts relative to fuzzy knowledge bases, and deciding logical consequences of fuzzy axioms from fuzzy knowledge bases, two other important reasoning problems are the best truth value bound problem and the best satisfiability bound problem, which we describe in the following.
Given a fuzzy knowledge base K and a classical axiom α, where α is neither a transitivity axiom nor an equality or inequality axiom, it is of interest to compute α's best lower and upper truth value bounds (best truth value bound (BTVB)). The greatest lower bound of α relative to K, denoted glb(K, α), is defined by glb(K, α) = sup {n | K |= α n} , while the least upper bound of α relative to K, denoted lub(K, α), is defined by
where sup ∅ = 0 and inf ∅ = 1. For example, the logical consequences in Examples 6.1 and 6.2 contain the best truth value bounds. Furthermore, note that
that is, the lub can be determined through the glb (and vice versa).
Similarly, lub(K, (a, b) : R) = glb(K, a : ¬∃R.{b}). Note also that K |= α n iff glb(K, α) n, and K |= α n iff lub(K, α) n.
Finally, the best satisfiability bound of a concept C relative to K, denoted glb(K, C), is defined by glb(K, C) = sup
Intuitively, among all models I of K, we determine the maximal degree of truth that the concept C may have over all individuals x ∈ ∆ I .
Example 6.3 Consider the knowledge base K in Example 3.1. Assume, that a car seller sells an Audi TT for $31500, as from the catalog price. A buyer is looking for a sports car, but wants to pay not more than around $30000. In classical description logics no agreement can be found. The problem relies on the crisp condition on the seller's and the buyer's price. A more fine grained approach would be to consider prices as concrete fuzzy sets instead. For example, the seller may consider optimal to sell above $31500, but can go down to $30500. The buyer prefers to spend less than $30000, but can go up to $32000. We may represent these statements by means of the following axioms (see Fig. 2 ):
AudiTT = SportsCar ∃hasPrice.rs(x; 30500, 31500) , Query = SportsCar ∃hasPrice.ls(x; 30000, 32000) .
Then, we may find out that the highest degree to which the concept C = AudiTT Query is satisfiable is 0.75 (the possibility that the Audi TT and the query matches is 0.75). That is, glb(K, C) = 0.75 and corresponds to the point where both requests intersect (that is, the car may be sold at $31250).
Problems such as determining the greatest lower bound of an axiom can be solved by relying on mixed integer linear programming (see, e.g., [9, 124, 126, 136, 135] ). Roughly, the basic idea is as follows. Consider a fuzzy knowledge base K = (R, T , A). To determine the greatest lower bound of an axiom, we combine appropriate description logic tableaux rules with methods developed in the context of many-valued logics [39] . For example, to determine, e.g., glb(K, a : C), we consider an expression of the form a : C x, where x is a [0, 1]-valued variable. Then, we construct a tableaux for K = (R, T , A ∪ {a : C x}) in which the application of satisfiability preserving rules generates new assertion axioms together with inequations over [0, 1]-valued variables. These inequations have to hold in order to respect the semantics of the description logic constructors. Finally, to determine the greatest lower bound, we minimize the original variable x such that all constraints are satisfied. 6 Interestingly, under Łukasiewicz and Zadeh logic, we end up with a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) optimization problem, while under the Product logic, we end up with a mixed integer quadratically constrained programming (MIQCP) optimization problem [107] . Similarly, glb(K, C 1 C 2 ) is the minimal value of x such that K = (R, T , A ∪ {a : C 1 ¬C 2 1 − x}) is satisfiable, where a is new individual. Therefore, the greatest lower bound problem can be reduced to the minimal satisfiability problem of a fuzzy knowledge base. Furthermore, glb(K, C) is determined by the maximal value of x such that (R, T , A ∪ {a : C x}) is satisfiable, where a is a new individual. In summary, glb(K, a : C)
= min x such that (R, T , A ∪ {a : C x}) satisfiable; glb(K, C 1 C 2 ) = min x such that (R, T , A ∪ {a : C 1 ¬C 2 1−x}) satisfiable; glb(K, C)
= max x such that (R, T , A ∪ {a : C x}) satisfiable.
Main Applications
Fuzzy logic has numerous practical applications in general (see, e.g., [65] ). Related to fuzzy description logics, we point out that they have first been proposed for logic-based information retrieval [92] , which originated from the idea to annotate textual documents with graded description logic sentences, which goes back to [93] . The idea has been reconsidered in [116, 137, 151] . In particular, (i) Zhang et al. [151] describe a semantic portal that is based on fuzzy description logics; (ii) Li et al. [74] present an improved semantic search model by integrating inference and information retrieval and an implementation in the security domain; (iii) Straccia and Visco [137] report on a multimedia information retrieval system based on a fuzzy DLR-Lite description logic, which is capable to deal with hundreds of thousands of images. D'Aquin et al. [17] provide a use case in the medical domain, where fuzzy concrete domains are used to identify tumor regions in x-ray images. Agarwal and Lamparter [1] use fuzzy description logics to improve searching and comparing products in electronic markets. They provide a more expressive search mechanism that is closer to human reasoning and that aggregates multiple search criteria to a single value (ranking of an offer relative to the query), thus enabling a better selection of offers to be considered for the negotiation. Liu et al. [79] use a fuzzy description logic to model the management part in project selection tasks.
Other Vague Ontology Languages
There are several extensions of description logics resp. ontology languages using the theory of fuzzy logic in the literature. They can be classified according to (a) the description logic resp. ontology language that they generalize, (b) the allowed fuzzy constructs, (c) the underlying fuzzy logics, and (d) their reasoning algorithms.
The first work is due to Yen [149] , who proposes a fuzzy extension of a very restricted sublanguage of ALC, called FL − [12, 71] . The work includes fuzzy terminological knowledge, but no fuzzy assertional knowledge, and it is based on Zadeh logic. It already informally talks about the use of fuzzy modifiers and fuzzy concrete domains. Though, the unique reasoning facility, the subsumption test, is a crisp yes/no questioning. Tresp and Molitor [140] consider a more general extension of fuzzy ALC. Like Yen, they also allow for fuzzy terminological knowledge along with a special form of fuzzy modifiers (which are a combination of two linear functions), but no fuzzy assertional knowledge, and they assume Zadeh logic as underlying fuzzy logic. The work also presents a sound and complete reasoning algorithm testing the subsumption relationship using a linear programming oracle.
Another fuzzy extension of ALC is due to Straccia [119, 121] , who allows for both fuzzy terminological and fuzzy assertional knowledge, but not for fuzzy modifiers and fuzzy concrete domains, and again assumes Zadeh logic as underlying fuzzy logic. Straccia [119, 121] also introduces the best truth value bound problem and provides a sound and complete reasoning algorithm based on completion rules. In [120] , Straccia reports a four-valued variant of fuzzy ALC. In the same spirit, Hölldobler et al. [49, 50] extend Straccia's fuzzy ALC with concept modifiers of the form f m (x) = x β , where β > 0, and present a sound and complete reasoning algorithm (based on completion rules) for the graded subsumption problem.
Straccia's works [123, 129, 134] are essentially as [121] , except that now the set of possible truth values is a complete lattice rather than [0, 1].
Sanchez and Tettamanzi [108, 109, 110] consider a fuzzy extension of the description logic ALCQ (without assertional component) under Zadeh logic, and they start addressing the issue of a fuzzy semantics of quantifiers. Essentially, fuzzy quantifiers allow to state sentences such as FaithfulCustomer (Most)buys.LowCalorieFood encoding "the set of all individuals that mostly by low calorie food". An algorithm is presented, which calculates the satisfiability interval for a fuzzy concept.
Hájek [42, 43] considers a fuzzy extension of the description logic ALC under arbitrary t-norms. He provides in particular algorithms for deciding whether C D 1 is a tautology and whether C D 1 is satisfiable, which are based on a reduction to the propositional BL logic for which a Hilbert-style axiomatization exists [41] (but see also [43] for the complexity of rational Pavelka logic, and see [10] for some complexity results on reasoning in fuzzy description logics).
Straccia [122] provides a translation of fuzzy ALC (with general concept inclusion axioms) into classical ALC. The translation is modular, and thus expected to be extendable to more expressive fuzzy description logics as well. The main idea is to translate a fuzzy assertion of the form a : C n into a crisp assertion a : C n , with the intended meaning "a is an instance of C to degree at least n". Then, concept inclusion axioms are used to correctly relate the C n 's. For example, C 0.7 C 0.6 is used to encode that whenever an individual is an instance of C to degree at least 0.7, then it is also an instance of C to degree at least 0.6. The translation is at most quadratic in the size of the fuzzy knowledge base. Note that the translation does not yet work in the presence of fuzzy modifiers and fuzzy concrete domains. Bobillo et al. [8] extend the approach to a variant of fuzzy SHOIN . The idea has further been considered in the works [76, 77] , which essentially provide a crisp language in which expressions of, e.g., the form a : ∀R 0.8 .C 0.9 are allowed, with the intended meaning "if a has an R-successor to degree at least 0.8, then this successor is also an instance of C to degree at least 0.9". The idea has further been extended to a distributed variant of fuzzy description logics in [80] .
In [90] , a fuzzy extension (based on Zadeh logic) of CARIN [72] is provided, which combines fuzzy description logics with non-recursive Horn rules.
Other extensions of fuzzy description logics concern their integration with fuzzy logic programs, which however goes beyond the scope of the present paper (see, e.g., [134,131,129,?,?,144] ). An interesting extension is due to Kang et al. [64] , who extends fuzzy description logics by comparison operators, e.g., to state that "Tom is taller than Tim". Another interesting extension is proposed by Dubois et al. [22] , who combine fuzzy description logics with possibility theory. Essentially, since a : C n is Boolean (either an interpretation satisfies it or not), we can build on top of it an uncertainty logic, which is based on possibility theory in [22] .
We recall that usually the semantics used for fuzzy description logics is based on Zadeh logic, but where the concept inclusion is crisp, that is, C D is viewed as ∀x.C(x) D(x). In [52, 140] , a calculus for fuzzy ALC [111] with fuzzy modifiers and simple TBoxes under Zadeh logic is reported. No indication for the BTVB problem is given. Straccia [119, 121] reports a calculus for fuzzy ALC and simple TBoxes under Zadeh logic and addresses the BTVB problem. How the satisfiability problem and the BTVB problem can be reduced to classical ALC, and thus can be solved by means of tools like FaCT and RACER is shown in [122] . Results providing a tableaux calculus for fuzzy SHIN under Zadeh logic (but only allowing for a restricted form of concept inclusion axioms, which are called fuzzy inclusion introductions and fuzzy equivalence introductions), by adapting similar techniques as for the classical counterpart, are shown in [116, 117] . Fuzzy general concept inclusion axioms under Zadeh logic can be managed as described in [118] . Also interesting is the work [75] , which provides a tableau for fuzzy SHI with general concept inclusion axioms. Finally, the reasoning techniques for classical SHOIN (D) [57] can be extended to [121] , as [116, 117, 114, 113] already show.
On the other hand, fuzzy tableaux algorithms under Zadeh semantics do not seem to be suitable to be adapted to other semantics, such as Łukasiewicz logic. Even more problematic is the fact that they are yet unable to deal with fuzzy concrete domains. Despite these negative results, recently, [126, 124] report a calculus for fuzzy ALC(D) whenever the connectives, the modifiers, and the fuzzy datatype predicates are representable as bounded mixed integer linear programs (MILPs). For example, Łukasiewicz logic satisfies these conditions as well as the membership functions for fuzzy datatype predicates that we have presented in this paper. Additionally, modifiers should be a combination of linear functions. In that case, the calculus consists of a set of constraint propagation rules and an invocation to an oracle for MILP. The method has been extended to fuzzy SHIF(D) [135] (the description logic behind OWL Lite) and a reasoner, called fuzzyDL, has been implemented and is available at Straccia's web page (though, a paper describing the algorithm has not yet been published). FuzzyDL supports more features than we have described in this work, whose description go beyond the scope of this work. The use of MILP for reasoning in fuzzy description logics is not surprising as their use for automated deduction in many-valued logics is well-known [38, 39] . Bobillo and Straccia [9] provide a calculus for fuzzy ALC(D) under product semantics.
A very recent problem for fuzzy description logics is the top-k retrieval problem. While in classical semantics, a tuple satisfies or does not satisfy a query, in fuzzy description logics, a tuple may satisfy a query to a degree. Hence, for example, given a conjunctive query over a fuzzy description logic knowledge base, it is of interest to compute only the top-k answers. While in relational databases, this problem is a current research area (see, e.g., [31, 60, 73] ), very few is known for the case of first-order knowledge bases in general (but see [132] ) and description logics in particular. The only works that we are aware of are [128, 133, 137] , which deal with the problem of finding the top-k result over knowledge bases in a fuzzy generalization of DL-Lite [13] (note that [99] is subsumed by [133] ).
Conclusion
Handling uncertainty and vagueness has started to play an important role in ontology languages for the Semantic Web. In this paper, we have first provided a brief introduction to uncertainty and vagueness at the propositional level, and we have summarized the basics of classical description logics for the Semantic Web. We have then described the most prominent approaches to handling probabilistic uncertainty, possibilistic uncertainty, and vagueness in expressive description logics for the Semantic Web, and we have given an overview of related approaches.
There are many important aspects that are open for future research. In particular, an important issue is to develop more scalable formalisms for handling probabilistic uncertainty, possibilistic uncertainty, and vagueness in ontology languages for the Semantic Web, especially those scalable formalisms that are also practically relevant. Another important issue is to provide more implementations, especially of scalable formalisms. It would also be interesting to integrate the above forms of uncertainty and vagueness in a single description logic for the Semantic Web. Another interesting issue for future research is the integration of probabilistic, possibilistic, and fuzzy description logics with rule-based languages for the Semantic Web.
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